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This 2019 issue of Phainomenon – Journal of Phenomenological Philosophy, 
entitled “Phantasy-Ego, Image Consciousness and Aesthetic Experience: 
Phenomenological approaches”, has its origins in a two-day workshop that took 
place in Lisbon, at the Faculty for Social Sciences and Humanities of 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, on the 9th and 10th of May 2018. The workshop 
was co-organized by the editors of this issue on behalf of two of the three research 
groups that constitute the “Culture and Value Laboratory” (CultureLab) at the 
Nova Institute of Philosophy (IFILNOVA): “Art, Critique and Aesthetic 
Experience” and “Questions of Subjectivity” (now “Art of Living Research 
Group”). The common aim of this collaboration was to cut across and bring into 
dialogue three different and yet often interrelated research interests: the 
phenomenology of “phantasy Ego”, of “image” and of “aesthetic experience”. 
We would especially like to thank Eduard Marbach for accepting our 
invitation to come to Lisbon and participate in the workshop. The presence of 
one of the seminal scholars of Husserl’s phenomenology of image and phantasy 
(suffice it to recall, he is the editor of Husserliana XXIII, i.e., the volume 
comprising most of Husserl’s unpublished works on Phantasy, Image 
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Consciousness and Memory)1 represented a unique opportunity for all of the 
participants – including one of the most relevant Husserlian scholars in the 
Portuguese-speaking world, Pedro Alves – to survey the three critical domains 
mentioned above and to seek to draw new connections among them (with special 
emphasis on Edmund Husserl’s analyses but also with attention to their unfolding 
in the thought of other phenomenologists such as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and 
contemporary analytical authors such as Walton and Wollheim). 
Given the promising outcomes of the workshop, Pedro Alves, as director of 
Phainomenon, proposed that we publish these contributions in this 2019 issue. 
We gladly accepted his invitation, and we would like to thank him for this. We 
would also like to extend our thanks to the editorial team of Phainomenon, which 
was in charge of the journal’s peer-review process and oversaw all editorial and 
production tasks. 
Together with Pedro Alves, and in accordance with the journal’s policy, we 
thought it beneficial to publish this issue of Phainomenon in both English and 
Portuguese, not least because this would allow us to make a Marbach text 
available in Portuguese for the first time. 
Marbach’s text opens the issue. It is an elaborated version––expressly 
prepared for this occasion––of his introduction to the 2006 selection of texts from 
Husserliana XXIII that he had edited for the publishing house Felix Meiner.2 
This new version appears here in Portuguese with the title “Sobre a elaboração 
progressiva dos pensamentos de Husserl acerca da fantasia e da consciência de 
imagem através da escrita”. The translation from German was written by one of 
the editors, Luís Aguiar de Sousa, who benefited from discussions with both 
Claudio Rozzoni and the editorial board of Phainomenon. 
In this text, Marbach shows how Husserl progressively came to differentiate 
between phantasy, on the one hand, and image consciousness, on the other, after 
an initial period in which he had been inclined to treat them as identical in the 
 
1 Edmund Husserl, Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der 
anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898-1925), hrsg. von 
E. Marbach, Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1980. English translation: Phantasy, Image 
Consciousness, and Memory (1898–1925). Dordrecht: Springer, 2005. Hereafter Hua 
XXIII. 
2 Eduard Marbach, «Einleitung des Herausgebers», in E. Husserl, Phantasie und 
Bildbewusstsein, Text nach Husserliana, Band XXIII, hrsg. von E. Marbach, Meiner, 
Hamburg, 2006, pp. XV-XLVI. 
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sense that “phantasy consciousness” was thought of as consciousness necessarily 
mediated by an image, as a form of “pictorialization [Verbildlichung]”.3 Along 
these lines, Marbach brings to light how Husserl came to characterize phantasy 
consciousness as a modification of perception that does not require the 
intervention of an iconic medium. Rather, what phantasy consciousness 
necessarily implies is the production of a phantasy-Ego that differentiates itself 
from the real one. 
Against this backdrop, Pedro Alves’ contribution delves into the structure of 
the peculiar form of subjectivity implied in fictional experience, discussing in 
particular the cases of “free phantasy in daydream” and “fictional stories”––
insofar as both entail a “scission of our egoic life” between an “actual” and a 
“fictional” world. Alves’ analysis is not limited to underscoring this egological 
split but also endeavors to shed light on how these two distinct dimensions can 
communicate and influence each other. More specifically, he goes so far as to 
stress the way in which the phantasized and the real Egos can be unified in a 
“synthesis of sameness” according to which each Ego produced by phantasy can 
be thought of as a variation of the real self––with the caveat that the phantasy 
worlds we experience through phantasy must not be considered coincident with 
possible ones: “fictional worlds are not posited as possible”. Instead, they are 
quasi-worlds in which any existential claims (either affirmative or negative) are 
neutralized and in which our beliefs, expectations, and feelings appear to be 
modified: quasi-beliefs, quasi-expectations, and quasi-feelings. 
Marco Cavallaro focuses precisely on this last point, delving into the vexata 
quaestio concerning the nature of fictional emotions. To put it roughly: how are 
emotions elicited by phantasy worlds to be understood and to be distinguished 
from the ordinary emotions aroused by existing things? To elucidate this slippery 
matter, Cavallaro develops a phenomenological approach to fictional emotions 
that, taking up the aforementioned phenomenon of the Ego-splitting, aims to 
clarify the intentional structure that underlies them. In so doing, Cavallaro also 
tries to lay bare how such a phenomenological approach to quasi-emotions can 
offer a profitable way to overcome some of the most challenging aporias implied 
by the well-known “paradox of fiction” that threatens fictional emotions with the 
mark of “irrationality”. 
 
3 See Hua XXIII, § 8. 
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Focusing on the first three parts of the famous four-part lecture course on 
“Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge”, which Husserl gave at Göttingen 
in the Winter Semester of 1904–1905, Andrea Scanziani outlines a 
phenomenological account of the distinction between phantasy and image 
consciousness from the point of view of Husserl’s intentional theory of attention. 
In particular, he seeks to clarify the role played by attention in intentional acts 
pertaining to these two types of consciousness, thereby bringing to light a 
definition of attention articulated through the notion of meaning or intending 
[Meinen] and interest. In addition, Scanziani highlights how such an inquiry 
concerning the role that attention plays in the Husserlian description of image 
consciousness might bear on our understanding of the phenomenological 
structure of aesthetic experience. 
In this regard, a closer reading of the aesthetic attitude is offered by Claudio 
Rozzoni’s text, which points out how, according to Husserl, when it comes to 
aesthetic consciousness of phenomena, our “interest” is directed not towards the 
existence of the object under consideration but rather towards the object’s way 
of appearing, a position that evidently echoes the necessary connection that Kant 
established between aesthetic judgment and disinterestedness. Nonetheless, 
Rozzoni makes clear that this is not equivalent to claiming that the aesthetic 
experience entails disinterestedness tout court. Rather, he argues that it is more 
profitable to view it as implying a change of interest, a shift from an existential 
interest towards “a valuing interest”, an “interest of the heart” that is intimately 
connected to the way in which phenomena appear.  
Finally, the importance of our pathic encounter with images is also to be found 
in Alexandra do Carmo’s text, which, going beyond the prevalent Husserlian 
scope of the other contributions, deals with the relation between image and art in 
the thought of Henri Maldiney. Carmo’s article builds on aspects of Maldiney’s 
critique of Heidegger’s thought on art. In particular, she stresses that when it 
comes to the most primordial structure of existence, we must put into question 
what Heidegger has characterized as its “projective” side in favor of its “pathic” 
dimension, that is, that which concerns our affectivity. It is precisely to this pre-
predicative and non-intentional dimension that we must turn, according to 
Carmo’s interpretation of Maldiney, if we want to gain a foothold on a more 
reliable inquiry into the origin of art. 
